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Hybrid Warfare Challenges 
to the Armed Forces:  
Realities and the Way Ahead
Kunendra Singh Yadav
In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining the battle, but 
indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
—Sun Tzu
Introduction
With the recent landmark changes in the political landscape of Jammu and 
Kashmir (J&K), a whole new era has been ushered in. A state which was 
unfortunately the test-bed of Pakistan’s nefarious agendas for decades, has 
now been subjected to a bold, exigent and logical step. The dissonance 
in decision-making has finally given way, laying fresh ground for renewed 
endeavours. With “Hybrid Warfare Challenges to the Armed Forces: 
Realities and Way Ahead” being the subject of scrutiny, a certain degree 
of factual clarity needs to be brought in right away. Three fundamental 
queries need to be answered at the outset.
First, is the term hybrid war a relatively recent construct? The answer 
is a definite no. The phenomenon is actually as old as the history of 
warfare itself. Chanakya,1 around 300 BC, propagated the use of sama 
(conciliation), dama (economic gratification), danda (use of force) 
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and bheda (dissension) i.e., all resources at the disposal of the king (in 
today’s context—comprehensive national power) to achieve the intended 
outcome. Second, are we adequately equipped to deal with the current and 
upcoming challenges posed by this warfare? The answer is yes. However, 
we certainly seem to be ill prepared at the moment and the same will 
be discussed later in the paper. Last, how true is the notion that hybrid 
warfare is a tool of the lesser opponent? At best, this can be considered 
partially true. Today, the greater opponents use hybrid tools with similar 
primacy. A case in point being the Russians in the Russo-Georgian War2 
of 2008. So, with these pointers as the backdrop, we move on to assess 
the reality of hybrid war in today’s context, the challenges it poses to our 
armed forces and the counter strategy desired. However, before we get to 
know the reality and the context in which the hybrid philosophy thrives, 
it seems logical to understand the basic anatomy and the paradigm which 
drives this philosophy.
Understanding the Anatomy
The Indian Army Land Warfare Doctrine 20183 puts across the hybrid 
warfare sentiment as:
Future conflicts will be characterized by operating in a zone of ambiguity 
where nations are neither at peace, nor at war, a “Grey Zone” which 
makes our task more complex. Wars will be hybrid in nature, a blend of 
conventional and unconventional, with the focus increasingly shifting 
to multi-domain warfare, varying from non-contact to contact warfare.
So, what is hybrid warfare? In the language of the learned, it is warfare 
which combines the lethality of conventional war with the fanatical fervour 
of irregular warfare4. Whereas, in simple military terms, it is a full spectrum 
warfare comprising the conventional, sub-conventional, unconventional 
and non-conventional means. It can, however, be stated without 
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exaggeration that, of late, this brutal brand has defied all sorts of definitions 
and is practised and professed by different names in different parts of the 
world. The major constituents of the definition of, and congruence with, 
similar contemporary strategies have been amplified below.
Conventional:5 In short, this type of warfare involves state actors and 
resources also including the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 
Nuclear (CBRN) dimensions. Most activities in such type of warfare 
lie in the open/overt domain.
Sub-Conventional:6 Activities in the sub-conventional sphere can be 
executed in the scenarios of both No War No Peace (NWNP) and 
peace proper. While aspects such as proxy war, terrorism, insurgency, 
cyber, civil war and public disorder fall under the ambit of NWNP, 
peace-time issues include criminal disorder and unlawful activities.
Unconventional:7 The majority of endeavours under this warfare 
lie in the covert domain to include subversion, sabotage, resistance, 
revolution, intelligence operations, etc.
Non-Conventional:8 The peculiarities of this subset are the most 
distinct, and which are conducted overtly/covertly by the state 
itself as part of its political agenda. Activities under this category 
are separate domains within themselves for the purpose of study 
and execution. Major strategies under this warfare include political, 
diplomatic, economic and demographic wars.
Apart from the means of warfare, countries use different terminologies 
which have a semblance with hybrid warfare. Every nation in the world 
today follows a unique trend line. It has its own goals and ambitions, in 
both the short and long terms. Comprehensive national power is accordingly 
orchestrated to achieve the desired end state. A number of terms are being 
contemporarily used by nations which correspond to the hybrid philosophy. 
Thus, there is a congruence of hybrid warfare with the contemporary 
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strategies used by some nations. The underlying spirit guiding these terms, 
however, can be understood as being the same. Some of these terms are:
Grey Zone Warfare:9 The term was originally part of the US lexicon. 
It denotes an environment between war and peace where hybrid tools 
of coercive influence, ranging from conventional forces to criminal 
activities, are utilised. As far as the US goes, it does not seek inclusion 
of conventional forces in the understanding of ‘grey zone’ conflicts, 
however, experts elsewhere are of the belief that such exclusion is not 
practicable as there is always the possibility of the use of conventional 
force in the grey zone.
Unrestricted Warfare:10 This warfare comprises the Chinese 
comprehension of hybrid/grey zone tactics. This sort of warfare has 
no restrictions placed on any kind of boundaries/means/methods 
to achieve what the nation thinks is justified. To the extent that even 
culture and religion are not exempted from its ambit.
Non-Linear Warfare:11 Such a phrase is very easily understood 
by a common military mind. For the uninitiated, the term was 
conceptualised by General Valery Gerasimov of the Russian Army 
in the year 2013. According to the concept, conflict does not have 
any clear front lines or distinct friendly/enemy areas. He even went 
on to mention that warfare transcends into the political, diplomatic, 
economic and informational domains of statecraft, making it more 
holistic and all inclusive.
Having glanced through these terms used interchangeably these days, the 
congruence is very well established. One should also not miss two significant 
aspects that have ubiquitously/unilaterally been endorsed by modern 
states in relation to hybrid war. These being the optimum exploitation of 
technology and use of information as frontline tools of war execution. The 
more meticulous and innovative the use, the better are the results.
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Means, Ways and Ends Paradigm: In order to obtain a simplistic 
and in-depth understanding of the hybrid construct, it may be prudent to 
glance at it through the means, ways and ends phenomenon. This paradigm 
brings out the mechanics of manifestation of this warfare in simple terms. 
If the ends denote the desired end state/outcome of a strategy, then the 
means signify the resources available at the disposal of the executor and the 
ways are the methods (courses of action) used to attain the desired end state 





















































territory and taking 
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Let us understand the above table by two contrasting examples. The 
military is one of the hard means available to a nation. These means use 
the way of conventional war to achieve the desired end state of capturing 
maximum value territory and taking prisoners of war, thereby causing 
national shame to the enemy. Taking the second example, the media is 
a soft means which uses the way of information operations to achieve 
a variety of ends such as lowering the morale of the enemy military or 
nation as a whole or causing social, ethnic or religious unrest in the 
target country. The list tabulated above, however, is neither definite nor 
exhaustive. This will keep evolving as newer/innovative means and ways 
are adopted by states to achieve more compelling ends.
It also becomes genuinely pertinent at this juncture to clear a major 
misgiving. Hybrid warfare is majorly seen by some as the tool of the 
weak. This understanding to an extent is supported by history. During 
the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979,12 China was a stronger opponent 
and still its victory is disputed to a large extent. Vietnam was militarily 
weak. It could pitch just about 70,000 troops as opposed to the 600,000 
Chinese troops. However, with the combination of various means such 
as the military, irregulars, spies and mobilising world opinion (which may 
be termed as hybrid in one word), the Vietnamese not only countered the 
Chinese conventional effort but also tilted the outcome of the war in their 
favour. Victory was, hence, claimed to be achieved. The thought is the 
same for Pakistan in our context. Since it cannot imagine outperforming 
India in a purely conventional war (majorly due to force and resource 
constraints), it resorts to hybrid warfare (proxy war in J&K;13 keeping the 
military extremely occupied by firing, infiltration and an aggressive stance 
on the international border; efforts to revive the Khalistan movement14 
in Punjab; disruptive activities in the hinterland, and so on). Thus, an 
indirect approach of bleeding India through a thousand cuts.
The above acts of Pakistan in the current scenario, however, need to 
be viewed from a different perspective altogether. Today, nations indulge 
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in hybrid war not just because they are weak or strong, but due to the 
flexibility and enormous gains it offers. The smaller nations employ these 
means because they have nothing to lose in a conflict with larger nations; 
it only increases their chances of victory. Whereas the larger nations in the 
same conflict use them because they want to win with the least efforts/
implications or, to say, winning without fighting, as Sun Tzu recommends. 
Therefore, while smaller nations like Pakistan and North Korea15 use such 
means (against India and the United States respectively), at one end of 
the conflict spectrum, countries like China16 and Russia17 also use then 
with conviction at the other end. The difference only lies in the type 
of means wherein one (say China) relies mainly on non-kinetic means, 
the other (say Pakistan) banks primarily on the kinetic. Having seen the 
preference for hybrid wars across nations, it is now time to get a contextual 
comprehension of the hybrid phenomenon as it relates to India. 
Contextual Comprehension
As highlighted earlier, hybrid war is definitely not a tool adopted due to 
the size or stature of a country. Every opponent has his own design of 
the battle and concept of application of means (both military and non-
military). Hence, it becomes extremely necessary to get the contextual 
comprehension right with respect to hybrid wars, as being executed by 
our adversaries. Such an understanding will certainly facilitate a better 
informed strategy based on pragmatic assumptions.
Western Adversary: The desire for operational parity, irrespective 
of the established capability mismatch, defines as well as justifies the 
use of sub-conventional means by Pakistan.18 All the wars fought with 
India, from the 1947 War till the Kargil conflict stand as testimony to 
the use of irregulars19 towards achieving war aims. In 1948, a force led 
by tribesmen and duly supported by serving and retired Army officers 
formed the tool of Pakistan’s conventional designs in Kashmir. This, of 
course, was coupled with the subversion of the troops of the state forces 
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of the Maharaja (an aspect of hybrid warfare). Similar was the story in 
1965 when internal disturbance in Kashmir over the missing hair of the 
Prophet emboldened Pakistan to induct a large number of irregular forces 
in conjunction with the regular Army to gain control over territory from 
multiple ingress points. The story in 1999 was the reverse. This time 
around, Pakistan wanted to prove that the act of intruders occupying 
high altitude heights overseeing the national highway to Leh was totally a 
Mujahideen endeavour, however, it was again proved wrong. Therefore, 
the presence of the hybrid content in all these instances is well established.
Use of hybrid warfare as a war execution strategy not only suits 
Pakistan, but comprises its domestic and strategic compulsion. 
Domestically, it needs to keep the Kashmir issue alive (either by internal 
disruption in Kashmir or seeking international intervention) for various 
reasons for which hybrid warfare is the best option as per cost benefit 
analysis. This would prove the worth of its military as well as polity to 
the anti-Indian elements in the country. It would also divert the Pakistani 
common man’s attention from core domestic issues such as slow growth, 
widespread corruption, and so on. 
Strategically, the geographic location of Pakistan affords it certain 
advantages. The country is located at the crossroads of South Asia, the 
Middle East and Central Asia. Time and again, its location has been a 
source of leverage, both for itself and the United States, towards meeting 
their Western agendas. Afghanistan is a case in point20. Pakistan has 
been practising hybrid war in Afghanistan since 1980s, initially through 
the Mujahideen and now the Taliban. In both cases, this has benefited 
Pakistan strategically as well as economically. The strategic benefit has 
three aspects attached to it. First, it provides Pakistan a place of relevance 
in the Global War on Terror against the Taliban in Afghanistan, courtesy 
the United States. Second, it also it gives a spot of prominence in various 
international conflict resolution forums for Afghanistan, enhancing its 
brand value in a way. Thirdly, its internal leverages over the Taliban help 
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Pakistan to retain a sort of latent control over Afghanistan. This, in turn, 
placates its notion of strategic depth against India and also helps extend 
its influence towards Central Asia. The economic benefits21 accruing by 
helping the United States against the Taliban are known worldwide. All 
this, in a way, can be attributed to Pakistan’s knack for executing hybrid 
warfare by using non-state actors.
Northern Adversary: The context is entirely different when we 
speak of China. The country is treading the road to superpower status. 
Armed with top-notch technology and world class weaponry, it is way 
ahead of India in terms of capability, both military and otherwise. Since 
any overt use of purely conventional means towards conflict resolution 
is likely to discredit its reputation in the comity of nations, it is more 
inclined towards the use of non-kinetic/non-contact grey zone tactics.22 
This has been amply demonstrated through its endeavours in the maritime 
domain (South and East China Seas and the Indian Ocean Region) and 
also the recent Doklam crisis.23 The point here being that India must 
expect an equal share of hybrid warfare application against it by China in 
both standalone and collusive modes.
Therefore, as evident from the above, every nation has its own 
justified reasons to indulge in the so-called hybridism. The greater danger 
being that hybrid means will see an ever greater adoption by nations in 
the times to come. Some reasons which naturally make this the warfare 
of choice24 are:
  No formal declaration of war is required. The majority of tools can be 
used during such war. 
  Peace/no war-no peace.
  Low cost option, with high payoffs.
  Attributability is always doubtful.
  Deniability factor.
  Avoids abrupt international attention as in the case of conventional 
war.
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  Survivability ratio of means applied is comparatively higher.
Challenges Posed to Indian Defence Forces
A concerted effort is being made by our adversaries to shrink the space for 
conventional war through the prosecution of unconventional operations at 
the lower end of the spectrum and threats of early and irrational use of 
conventional weapons at the other. 
—The Indian Army Land Warfare Doctrine 201825 
The armed forces of any nation are a lucrative target for an adversary 
indulging in hybrid warfare activities. Despite their reach, precision and 
lethality, the forces are extremely vulnerable due to their large logistic 
and administrative entities. Cumulatively, they pose a viable signature, 
sometimes greater than the mass of combat forces themselves. Any dent 
or discredit caused is likely to catch headlines and impact the overall 
morale of the Army and the state. At the same time, such activities 
keep the forces engaged below the conventional threshold, hampering 
their overall conventional preparedness. The challenges, thus, posed by 
hybrid warfare to the armed forces are myriad; however, for the sake of 
comprehension and analysis, these have primarily been divided into the 
physical and virtual domains, as elucidated below.
Physical Domain Challenges: In order to facilitate assimilation, 
predicaments in the physical domain can further be sliced into Pakistan-
and China-centric.
  Pakistan-Centric:26 If one was to characterise the nature of activities 
originating from the western borders, these can be stated as crude, 
unscientific and uncoordinated to a large extent. Conventionally, 
involvement of regular forces in support of hybrid war is majorly 
limited to a full scale war under a nuclear umbrella, a short swift limited 
war, Border Action Team (BAT) action, Ceasefire Violations (CFVs) 
and logistics support to infiltrating columns. The majority of the 
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efforts are being diverted towards sub-conventional, unconventional 
and non-conventional endeavours by way of infiltration by militants 
across the Line of Control/International Border (LoC/IB) and also 
through the maritime medium, agitational dynamics, sleeper cells, 
sabotage activities, smuggling, piracy, and malignant endeavours on 
the religious, social and ethnic fronts.
  China-Centric:27 Our northern neighbour follows a totally 
different class of physical activities in the hybrid domain. These 
being the likes of standoffs on the IB, transgressions, intrusions, 
increasing assertiveness on the political and military fronts, forays 
into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), economic colonisation, debt 
trap, active pursuance of the equity for debt model, posing threats 
to island territories, collusion with like-minded adversaries and an 
overall attitude of the so-called coercive gradualism.28 It can be stated 
with conviction that these activities, ranging the from the tactical to 
the strategic level, are well articulated, with control at the highest 
levels. 
Virtual Domain Challenges: As far as the virtual domain is 
concerned, the Chinese have an upper hand, however, of late, Pakistan 
has also shown promising competitiveness, especially in the information 
domain. Its special liking for subverting the Indian armed forces personnel 
through a well designed network of intelligence operatives and, of late, 
through a deft use of social media, has been an ongoing concern for 
the Indian forces.29 The propaganda war launched by Pakistan in the 
international media in response to the Indian abrogation of Article 370 
from J&K is worth noting.30 While the physical activities are seemingly 
overt in nature, those in the virtual sphere are mostly covert in design, 
with very few open signatures. This is where the characteristics of 
attributability/deniability come into play more often. The activities in 
this domain are generally of a strategic nature, with severe and sometimes 
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crippling consequences for nation-states. China specifically has made 
great strides in the use of non-contact warfare to achieve its national 
aims. These include cyber warfare, Electronic Warfare (EW), Integrated 
Network Electronic Warfare (INEW), information operations (“Three 
Warfare Strategy”31 including psychological warfare, media warfare, and 
legal warfare), political and diplomatic parlaying, economic warfare and 
irredentism/demographic warfare.32
Counter-Strategy
Hence, given the nuances, any strategy aimed at countering the 
manifestations of hybrid war in any form/name has to factor in the 
emerging security environment, technological advancements and multi-
spectrum conflict challenges facing the nation today. It is evident that 
the current and future wars will be more hybrid in content and equally 
collusive or collaborative in context. The counter means, thus, employed 
or intended to be employed, must remain present-relevant and future, 
ready. It is also prudent to believe that hybrid wars are ever on, and 
different approaches/strategies are required to tackle them during 
peace/No War-No Peace (NWNP) and during active hostilities. The 
common sense motto of ‘Be Prepared’ will, however, apply equally across 
all approaches. Two scenarios to be taken into consideration with regard 
to counter-strategies are discussed briefly below.
Peace/NWNP Scenario: Whole of the Government Approach:33 
This aspect has to be understood with all the coherence it merits. All 
elements of national power should come into play in tackling such 
a threat. The military is just one of them but the military as the first 
responder always should not be the norm.34 A state which always and 
every time looks upon its military to either counter an existing issue or 
as a tool of retribution, will be typecast and seen as one having limited 
options. The government has shown a definite resolve towards countering 
various aspects of hybrid warfare, the major steps being the intent to 
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dislodge terrorist infrastructure across the LoC through surgical strikes 
and the recently conducted Balakot strikes; a big jolt to the economic 
terrorism propagated by Pakistan by demonetisation in the year 2016; 
and the recent move to abrogate Article 370 and downgrade the status of 
J&K to a Union Territory (UT) status. These measures, falling under the 
military, economic and political domains, form part of the government’s 
approach towards countering various facets of hybrid warfare to different 
extents. Such measures, demonstrating the will of the government, are 
needed every time the adversary attempts any misadventure in the hybrid 
domain, to unhinge and push him onto the back foot, irrespective of the 
political set-up of the time. 
Military Capability Enhancement: The military, which primarily 
forms the conventional component of hybrid warfare, has to be further 
empowered, building the requisite capabilities in both the physical and 
virtual domains, with strong linkages to national level abilities. A long-
term integrated perspective plan for capability development of the forces 
is already in place and needs to be pursued with priority, with assured 
budgetary support.35 Talking of specifics, any counter-strategy, whether 
military or otherwise, will fundamentally rest on our capability to acquire 
actionable intelligence. Though considerable progress has been made 
with respect to Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
capabilities36 through the space and aerial dimensions (remote sensing 
satellite series, electronic intelligence satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, 
long range maritime patrol aircraft), a lot is still desired. These capabilities 
need to be built to the requisite numbers, with their products percolating 
seamlessly down to the tactical level. The role of precise image intelligence 
acquired through cartosat satellites for successfully executing the surgical 
strikes in 2015 is no secret. 
Focus on Non-Contact Warfare Capability:37 Battles will now 
have a prolonged non-contact phase and a serious blend of the hybrid 
dimension. This cannot be neglected or downplayed any more. Our 
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capabilities in this domain have to emerge as the best and top-notch. 
We have no choice in this whatsoever. Our endeavours such as renewed 
importance to information warfare (including psychological operations, 
electronic warfare and cyber warfare) at all levels in the armed forces, 
establishment of the Defence Cyber and Space Agency (to be upgraded 
to the force level of command)38 and the recently conducted Anti-Satellite 
(ASAT) tests need to be built on further in all earnest.
Embrace Technology: Technology has redefined the way wars are, 
and will be, fought in future. It has become a major enabler of both 
kinetic and non-kinetic dimensions of war-fighting. Our slow pace 
of technology adoption can be attributed to heavy import reliance. 
A country relying majorly on trade for meeting its security needs will 
always be in the process of catching up. There is, hence, a dire need 
to promote Make In India and indigenous products rather than look 
abroad at all times. The Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap 
2018 (TPCR)39 provides the industry an overview of the equipment that 
is envisaged to be inducted into the forces up to the late 2020s. It aims 
at driving the technology development process in right earnest. The 
point to be understood here being that only laying down what is desired 
by the forces may not be adequate at this stage: it has to be backed up 
by proper government support and eager willingness by the military to 
accept indigenous products.40 The Akash surface-to-air missile system, 
Arjun tank, Dhruv utility helicopter, Tejas multi-role fighter aircraft, 
Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher and Nag anti-tank missile are some of 
the indigenous weapon systems doing exceedingly well for the Services. 
The only need is to keep pushing this forward. Nations much smaller 
in size like Singapore and Israel should be looked upon as role models 
with regard to optimising technology. There is no choice but to endorse 
technology in every affair of the nation and military. It is a simple pursue 
or perish situation. 
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Active Hostilities
Coherence of Action: All the abilities/capabilities that we as a nation 
have built upon need to be harnessed in entirety during hostilities. 
The linear, standalone methodology of war-fighting, with cooperation 
and coordination dependent on personalities, will have to give way to 
jointness, not only at the level of the Services but at the national level. 
The recent announcement with regards to the creation of the post of 
Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)41 as a single point military adviser to the 
government is a long pending and welcome step. Its implementation has 
to be deliberate and meticulous.
Citizens’ Role: The onus of fighting a hybrid enemy cannot rest 
solely on the defence, paramilitary or police forces—it has to be a national 
effort with every citizen playing his role by being security conscious during 
peace/no war-no peace/active hostilities. Some proposed measures in 
this regard are listed below.
  Rejuvenation of Home Guards:42 The Home Guards is a voluntary 
citizens’ force to act as an auxiliary element to the police for 
assistance during exigent/emergent situations. Border states have 
a Border Wing version of the Home Guards which serves as an 
auxiliary element to the Border Security Force (BSF), with clear-
cut roles during hostilities such as counter-infiltration, protection of 
vulnerable areas and points and security of lines of communication. 
Presently, there is sub-optional utilisation of the Home Guards and 
especially the Border Wing. It is proposed that the Border Wing of 
the Home Guards be shifted under Ministry of Defence from the 
Ministry of Home Affairs. Thereafter, this force may be rejuvenated 
by enhanced training and, further, orbatted under static formations 
to strengthen the rear area security/counter hybrid war posture. 
This force, comprising locals of the area, will function on the lines of 
scouts and act as the eyes and ears of field formations in both forward 
and rear areas.
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  Village Defence Committee:43 This was instituted in the state of 
J&K to make border areas self-sufficient in terms of security. It is 
an organisation of the villagers, by the villagers and for the villagers. 
The effective utilisation of these entities is dying down due to weak 
management. There is talk to even disband them. This may not be 
the correct approach. The role of village defence committees in the 
1965 War is well known. They acted as force multipliers to the Army 
by reporting and countering the moves of the irregular forces who 
operated by merging with the population. It is proposed that these 
committees be further strengthened by proper training and equipping. 
A retired Serviceman in the village should be made responsible for 
their training. The instructor and members (8-10, depending on the 
size of the village) may even be given an honorarium to incentivise 
the matter.
  Role of National Cadet Corps:44 The role and charter of the National 
Cadet Corps (NCC) is well known to all. However, it is felt that the 
NCC can play a larger role towards building a strong and secure society. 
To this end, it may be prudent to make one year of NCC enrolment 
compulsory in colleges. During this year, the enrolled undergraduates 
may be exposed to one outdoor camp, including basic firing and field 
craft. By doing this, over a period of time, we can at least move towards 
a security conscious society which can, to an extent, look after its self-
security aspects. During a war, such people will be better placed to look 
after themselves and may even serve as volunteers in the communication 
zone.
Disruptive Response: The armed forces are well aware that the 
time for set-piece conventional battles is long over. Today, the war may 
well be over before the military battle begins, or it may be half won/lost 
before the troops set foot on the ground as happened in Georgia and East 
Ukraine. Our armed forces have to be prepared to operate under such 
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eventualities, tailoring our doctrines, strategies, tactics, techniques and 
procedures accordingly. In other words, our response has to be disruptive 
in nature which poses a paradigm not planned for by the enemy. This 
can only be achieved by creating core competencies in new dimensions 
of warfare through the use of emerging means such as drones, artificial 
intelligence, robotics and social media.45 Towards this end, flexibility and 
mental mobility will need to be the hallmarks of the military and political 
leadership at all levels.
Conclusion
The low liability and high payoff paradigm of hybrid warfare will ensure 
that this remains the preferred choice of war-waging for many nations, 
irrespective of their size and stature. As a peace-loving nation, we may 
not subscribe to this ideology, but will definitely have to be prepared 
to confront it and, at times, to preempt it suitably. Our capabilities, 
hence, have to match our intent. Towards this, ‘A Whole of the Nation 
Approach’ both towards coherent capability building and a coordinated 
response mechanism at the national level is a sine-qua-non.
Notes
1. P K Gautam, “Understanding Kautilya’s Four Upayas”, IDSA Comment, June 20, 
2013. Available at https://idsa.in/idsacomments/UnderstandingKautilyasFourUpayas_
pkgautam_200613. Accessed on October 8, 2019.
2. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War In Georgia, 
(New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 181-196.
3. Umong Sethi, “Multi-Domain Warfare in the Indian Context – A Whole of Nation 
Approach”, Synergy Journal, CENJOWS, February 2019 Issue, pp. 18-27. Available at 
https://www.cenjows.gov.in/upload_images/pdf/Synergy%20-%20Feb%202019.pdf. 
Accessed on October 8, 2019. 
4. Frank Hoffman, “Conflict in the 21 Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars”, Potomac Institute 
for Policy Studies and Centre for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, 2007, pp. 17-25. 
Available at https://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_
hybridwar_0108.pdf. Accessed on October 8, 2019. 
5. Manpreet Sethi, “Conventional War in Presence of Nuclear Weapons”, IDSA, Strategic 
Analysis, Vol. 33, Issue 3, 2009, pp. 415-425.
kunendra singh yadav
CLAWS Journal l Winter 2019 139
6. Col K C Dixit, “Sub-Conventional Warfare Requirement, Impact and Way Ahead”, IDSA, 
Issue 1, pp. 1-3. Available at https://idsa.in/system/files/jds_4_1_kcdixit.pdf, Accessed 
on October 8, 2019. 
7. Davis S. Maxwell, “Do we Really Understand Unconventional Warfare?, Small Wars 
Journal, 2014. Available at https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/do-we-really-
understand-unconventional-warfare. Accessed on October 8, 2019. 
8. Christopher S. Chivvis, “Understanding Russian ‘Hybrid War’ and What can be Done 
About it”, Rand Corporation, March 22, 2017, pp. 1-9. Available at https://www.
rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT468/RAND_CT468.pdf. 
Accessed on October 8, 2019.
9. Vikrant Deshpande, ed., Hybrid Warfare: The Changing Character of Conflict (New Delhi: 
IDSA/Pentagon Press, 2018), pp. 25-37.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Harjeet Singh, A War Nobody Won: The Sino –Vietnam War 1979 (New Delhi: Pentagon 
Press, 2015), pp. 1-12. 
13. “Kashmir is an Issue of Proxy War: VK Singh”, Business Standard, February 19, 2019. 
Available at https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/kashmir-is-an-issue-
of-proxy-war-vk-singh-119021900180_1.html. Accessed on October 8, 2019. 
14. “Pakistan’s Plot to Back Khalistan Movement Exposed”, Business Standard, December 
18, 2018. Available at https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/pakistan-s-
plot-to-back-khalistan-movement-exposed-118121800593_1.html, Accessed on October 
9, 2019.
15. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Military Stalemate: How North Korea Could win a War with the 
US”, The Diplomat, October 10, 2017. Available at https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/
military-stalemate-how-north-korea-could-win-a-war-with-the-us/. Accessed on October 
9, 2019. 
16. Abhay Kumar Singh, “Expanding the Turbulent Maritime Philosophy: Grey Zone Conflicts 
with the Chinese Characteristics” in Deshpande, ed., n. 9, pp. 142-172.
17. Ibid.
18. General Bipin Rawat, “Addressing the Challenges of Hybrid Conflict in the 21st Century”, 
Chief of Army Staff Address in IDSA, 2018, Key Speeches. 
19. Vivek Chadda, “Pakistan’s Hybrid War in South Asia: Case Study of India and Afghanistan”, 
in Deshpande, ed., n. 9, pp. 39-46. 
20. Ibid., pp. 47-52.
21. Ahmed Waqas Waheed, “Pakistan’s Dependence on US Patronage: The Politics of Limited 
Influence”, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, Vol. 4, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 
69-94.
22. John Raine, “War or Peace? Understanding the Grey Zone”, International Institute 
of Strategic Studies, April 3, 2019. Available at https://www.iiss.org/blogs/
analysis/2019/04/understanding-the-grey-zone. Accessed on October 9, 2019.
hybrid Warfare Challenges to the armed forCes
140  CLAWS Journal l Winter 2019
23. G G Dwivedi, “Doklam, China’s Strategic Calculus and India’s Policy Options”, IDSA 
Comment, August 11, 2017. Available at https://idsa.in/idsacomments/doklam-china-




26. Narender Kumar, “War Beyond Rules: Hybrid War and India’s Preparedness” CLAWS 
Journal, Summer 2017. Available at https://archive.claws.in/images/journals_
doc/231704000_05_chap(1)(1).pdf. Accessed on October 9, 2019.  
27. Ibid.
28. W G Pierce,” Understanding Coercive Gradualism” Strategic Studies Institute, Autumn 
Issue, 2015, pp. 52-57.
29. “Pak Female Agent Honey Traps 50 Indian Soldiers; Army Jawan Arrested in Jaisalmer 
for Spying”, The Economic Times, January 13, 2019. Available at https://economictimes.
indiatimes.com/news/defence/pak-female-agent-honey-traps-50-indian-soldiers-army-
jawan-arrested-in-jaisalmer-for-spying/articleshow/67510846.cms?from=mdr. Accessed 
on October 9, 2019.
30. Harsha Kakkar, “Fighting the International Propaganda War”, CENJOWS. Available at 
https://cenjows.gov.in/upload_images/pdf/Fighting%20the%20international%20by%20
Maj%20Gen%20Harsha%20Kakar%20(Retd)%20on%2002%20Sep%202019.pdf. Accessed 
on October 9, 2019. 
31. Michael Raska, “China and the ‘Three Warfares’”, The Diplomat, December 18, 
2015. Available at https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/hybrid-warfare-with-chinese-
characteristics-2/. Accessed on October 9, 2019. 
32. Taylor Washburn, “Between Russia and China, a Demographic Time Bomb”, The National 
Interest, August 23, 2013. Available at https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/
between-russia-china-demographic-time-bomb-8938. Accessed on October 9, 2019. 
33. Ibid.
34. Narender Kumar, “Development of Alternative Capabilities Must to Punish Pakistan for 
Cross-Border Terrorism”, CLAWS, Issue Brief, No. 175, 2019. 
35. Laxman Kumar Behera, “Defense Agenda for Modi Government 2.0”, IDSA Policy 
Brief, June 6, 2019, p. 2. Available at https://idsa.in/policybrief/defence-agenda-modi-
government-2.0-lkbehera-060619. Accessed on October 9, 2019. 
36. Debalina Ghoshal, “Possessing Advanced ISR Capabilities is Crucial to India’s 
Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence”, FORCE, 2019. Available at http://forceindia.
net/aero-india-2019/long-way-go/. Accessed on October 9, 2019. 
37. General Bipin Rawat, “Non-Contact Warfare is Imminent in Near Future”, Chief of Army 
Staff, Address during valedictory Session of “National Conference on Self-Reliance in 
Defence Manufacturing 2.0” at FINS.
38. Sushant Singh, “Coming Soon: Ministry of Defense’s Cyber, Space, Special Operations 
Division”, The Indian Express, October 16, 2017. Available at https://indianexpress.com/
kunendra singh yadav
CLAWS Journal l Winter 2019 141
article/india/coming-soon-ministry-of-defence-mods-cyber-space-special-operations-
divisions-4892404/. Accessed on October 9, 2019. 
39.  “Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap”, Ministry of Defence, Government of 
India, 2018. Available at http://mod.gov.in, pp. 1.
40. Ranjit Ghosh, Indigenization: Key to Self –Sufficiency and Strategic Capability (New Delhi: 
Pentagon Press/IDSA, 2016). 
41. R Chandrashekhar, “An Empowered CDS”, CENJOWS, 2019. Available at https://
cenjows.gov.in/upload_images/pdf/Corrected%20-%20An%20Empowered%20CDS%20
by%20Shri%20RC%20on%2020%20Aug%202019.pdf. Accessed on October 9, 2019. 
42. Directorate General Fire Services, Civil Defense and Home Guards, Available at http://
dgfscdhg.gov.in, Accessed on September 7, 2019.
43.  J P Singh, “Strengthening Village Defense Committees”, Daily Excelsior, January 7, 2019. 
Available at https://www.dailyexcelsior.com/strengthening-village-defence-committees/ 
Accessed on September 6, 2019.
44. Press Information Bureau, “DG NCC Highlights Role of Cadets in Nation Building”, 
Government of India, Available at http://pib.gov.in. Accessed on September 8, 2019.
45. Saurav Tiwari, “Impact of Disruptive Technologies on Warfare” CLAWS Issue Brief, No. 
185, 2019, p. 2. Available at https://www.claws.in/publication/impact-of-disruptive-
technologies-on-warfare/. Accessed on October 9, 2019. 
hybrid Warfare Challenges to the armed forCes
